Nilene After Eskelson v. Allen C. Eskelson : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Nilene After Eskelson v. Allen C. Eskelson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
T Quentin Cannon; Cannon and Duffin; Attorneys for Appellant.
Joel M Allred; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Eskelson v. Eskelson, No. 13604.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/777
w&t RECEIVED LAW LIBRARY; 
IN THE SUPREME coyEEgr 1375 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
*. Reuben Clark Law School 
NILENE AFTON ESKELSON, J 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
Case No. 
v s
' / 13604 
ALLEN ^KELSON 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Hon. James E. Sawaya, Judge 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
T. (^UEJNTIN CANNON, 
for CANNON AND DUFFIN 
510 Ten Broadway Building r ~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 § 
Attorneys for Appellant A \ \ r LE 
1 3 1 9 7 4 
Suprame Coi r iTutLT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL ARE 
UNTIMELY 6 
POINT II 
THE DIVORCE WAS NOT FINAL WHEN 
THE ORDER STAYING THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE WAS ENTERED 10 
POINT III 
THE ORDER OF APRIL 20, 1973, NOT THE 
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 9, 1973, OPERATED 
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS REPRESENTED AT 
THE APRIL 20 HEARING BY HER TRIAL 
COUNSEL WHO APPEARED PURSUANT 
TO NOTICE 12 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING 
ASIDE ITS EARLIER ORDERS RELATING TO 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 14 
CONCLUSION 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
ANNOTATIONS CITED 
6 ALR 2d 20-21 
6 ALR 2d, Section 10, p. 1294 22 
119 ALR 1370 23 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Anderson, 
3 Ut. 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 9 11 
Baer v. Young, 
25 Ut. 2d 198, 479 P.2d 351 8 
Edwards v. Edwards (Kansas), 
324 P.2d 150 (1958) 19 
Kumlin v. Kumlin, 
200 Minn. 26, 273 N.W. 253 22 
In re Lynch's Estate, 
123 Ut. 57, 254 P.2d 454 10 
Maddox v. Maddox, 
276 Ala. 197, 160 So. 2d 481 22 
Manwill v. Oyler, 
11 U.2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 9 
Mittman v. Mittman, 
263 App. Div. 384, 33 NYS 2d 211 22 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
105 Ut. 574, 144 P.2d 528 17 
Richardson v. Richardson, 
218 Minn. 42, 15 N.W. 2d 127 22 
Tolls v. Tolls, 
160 Ar. 317, 85 P.2d 366 23 
Watson v. Anderson, 
29 Ut. 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS CITED 
86 C.J.S., "Time", Section 10, Page 837 10 
52 Am Jur, "Time", Section 11, Page 338 10 
24 Am Jur 2d, "Divorce and Separation", 
Section 557, Page 682 21 
RULES OF PROCEDURE CITED 
72 (a) 8, 9 
72 (b) 8, 9 
6 (a) 11 
STATUTES CITED 
30-3-7 U.CA 10, 12 
68-3-7 U.CA 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NILENE AFTON ESKELSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLEN C. ESKELSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order made six months 
after the trial of the divorce of the parties in Third Dis-
trict Court. The Order dated January 18, 1974, was made 
after a hearing on an Order to Show Cause at which the 
Court was requested by the Appellant, among other things, 
to reduce alleged arrearages of temporary alimony and 
support, which supposedly pre-dated the Decree, to judg-
ment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge James E. Sawaya found that the Orders upon 
which the contentions of the Appellant were based were 
previously "set aside" and that the issues raised by such 
contentions were "merged in the final decree". The Court 
Case No. 
13604 
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further expressly found, as a factual matter, that during 
the period of time when the arrearages allegedly accumu-
lated "the defendant was disabled and unable to financi-
ally meet this obligation." (R. 200) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks the affirmance of the Memor-
andum Decision of the Trial Court dated January 18, 1974, 
(R. 199) and of the subsequent Order dated January 28, 
1974, (R. 202) which was based on Judge Sawaya's Find-
ings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1972, the Plaintiff (Appellant) filed a 
Complaint in divorce against the Defendant (Respondent). 
The Complaint, which alleged that the Defendant was 
"able bodied", "presently employed" and earning approxi-
mately "$14,000.00 a year," was served on the Defendant 
at Lemmon Valley, Nevada on May 22, 1972. When 
served, the Defendant, who had been seriously injured 
in an automobile accident on April 15, 1972, was, in fact, 
both disabled and unemployed. 
On July 19, 1972, pursuant to a hearing on an Order 
to Show Cause, Judge Merrill C. Faux awarded custody of 
the minor child of the parties, $75.00 per month as tem-
porary child support, $500.00 per month as temporary 
alimony, $100.00 attorney fees and some shares in the 
Interstate Motor Lines Credit Union to the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant was neither present at the hearing nor repre-
sented by counsel and was a resident of the State of 
Nevada. At the time of the award, the Defendant's total 
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monthly income from all sources was less than $575.00. 
The award was erroneously founded on the assumption 
that the Defendant had income equivalent to that earned 
in 1971, prior to his disability. 
On August 9, 1972, the District Court, Emmett L. 
Brown presiding, granted a Decree of Divorce and made 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were, by 
the terms of the documents, to become final three months 
after entry. (R. 44) The divorce was granted after the 
entry of the Defendant's default. 
On November 9, 1972, the Court, through Merrill 
C. Faux, the same judge who presided over the Hearing 
on the Order to Show Cause, deferred the "effective date" 
of the Decree pending "further order" of the Court. (R. 
50) On the same day, the Defendant, through his counsel, 
moved to set aside the Default Judgment under the provi-
sions of Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 55) Counsel for the parties thereupon stipulated to 
the dissolution of the marriage as provided in the Decree, 
the effective date of which was deferred, and agreed that 
all other matters raised by the Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment "may be held in abeyance to be dis-
posed of at the time Defendant's Motion is heard." The 
Stipulation was drafted by Plaintiff's original Counsel, 
D. Gary Christian. (R. 58) In his Order Terminating 
Marriage Relationship of Parties, which was signed by 
Judge Snow, Mr. Christian specified that "Those matters 
raised by Defendant in his Motion dated November 9, 
1972, relating to alimony, child support and other matters 
are held in abeyance and are not final until the time of 
3 
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the hearing of Defendant's Motion and an Order made in 
relation thereto." (R. 60, emphasis supplied). 
On March 26, 1973, the Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment was heard before Marcellus 
K. Snow. The Affidavit of the Defendant in support of 
the Motion (R. 61), which was, as far as these matters are 
concerned, uncontroverted, asserted that the Defendant 
was injured on April 15, 1972; that he required surgery 
on June 4, 1972, twelve days after the Complaint was 
filed; that, on the day the Decree was entered, the De-
fendant was, on orders of his physician, "unable to drive 
and, basically, advised against travel of every kind." (R. 
63) It was further alleged that the Defendant had, with 
reasonable diligence, secured the services of Nevada 
counsel, whose performance he had sought to monitor, and 
that the inexcusably dilatory performance of his counsel, 
through no fault of the Defendant, had resulted in the 
taking of the default. (R. 62) 
On April 20, 1973, after Notice (R. 55, 65) and a 
hearing attended by counsel for both parties, the De-
fendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was 
granted (R. 74) and the Defendant was permitted, by 
order of the Court, to answer each of the allegations of 
the original Complaint with the exception of those per-
taining to the dissolution of the marriage. (R. 74) Defend-
ant filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 76) The 
Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant's Counterclaim (R. 
81), proceeded to make discovery (R. 84) and stipulated 
to the Defendant's Motion for Early Trial. (R. 88) 
4 
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The case was tried over a period of several days be-
fore the Honorable James E. Sawaya. Upon the full hear-
ing of all pertinent facts, the Court drafted the Memoran-
dum Decision (R. 132) upon which the Decree was based. 
At the time of trial, the Defendant was receiving, as his 
sole source of income, Social Security Disability. (R. 132) 
The Decree granted "nominal" alimony of $1.00 per year, 
and awarded the home of the parties to the Plaintiff sub-
ject to the requirement that she pay the Defendant 
$4,000.00 upon remarriage, when the minor child achiev-
ed his majority or when the home was sold. (R. 133) The 
Memorandum Decision provided for attorney's fees in the 
sum of $500.00. (R. 133) The Decree, drafted by Plain-
tiff's counsel, made reference to the $500.00 figure for 
attorney's fees and indicated that the $500.00 amount was 
"in addition to any amount awarded by the Court to 
Plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorney on any 
previous Order to Show Causes". (R. 140) Plaintiff's 
trial counsel then withdrew from the case. (R. 141) On 
September 17, 1973, Defendant's Counsel moved to amend 
the Decree of Divorce so that the provision for attorney 
fees might more nearly conform to the Memorandum De-
cision of Judge Sawaya. Notice of the hearing was given 
directly to the Plaintiff. (R. 144) 
Subsequent to the trial, and after the amendment of 
the Decree, Defendant alleged by means of an Order to 
Show Cause, that the Plaintiff had remarried and was 
living in Lindon, Utah, as Mrs. Milton Lyman. (R. 143) 
The Defendant alleged, by virtue of the Plaintiffs re-
marriage, that he was entitled to the $4,000.00 for his 
interest in the home of the parties as provided by the 
5 
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Memorandum Decision. The Defendant's Order to Show 
Cause was heard on December 7, 1973.1 In response to 
this Order to Show Cause, first a Counter-Affidavit (R. 
150), and then, later, an Affadivit in Support of an Order 
to Show Cause (R. 176) for the Plaintiff, was filed with 
the Court. In these documents, the issues raised at the 
Hearing on the Second Order to Show Cause, brought by 
the Plaintiff on January 17, 1974, which gave rise to this 
appeal, were first raised. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL ARE 
UNTIMELY. 
The Plaintiff claims on appeal, for the first time ever, 
that the Order of the Court (R. 50) which stayed the effec-
tive date of the Decree until a hearing on the Defend-
ant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment could be 
heard, was null and void. (Apps. Brief, p. 22) It is 
also now alleged that the Decree was final on November 
9, 1972, when the Court was petitioned by the Defendant 
to set aside its earlier default judgment. 
iThe Plaintiff denied that she had in fact remarried. The Court 
concurred and denied the Defendant's motion to compel payment of the 
$4,000.00 because the prerequisite condition, remarriage, had not occurred. 
There was, however, evidence that the Plaintiff had registered at the Utah 
Valley Hospital as Nilene Lyman and at the office of her physician; that 
she had purchased the Orchid Shop in Lindon, Utah, under the name 
Lyman (R. 156); that the phone in her Lindon residence was so listed; 
that she had purchased wholesale floral supplies under that name (Ex-
hibits filed December 7, 1973); that she had "represented" that she was 
Mrs. Lyman to "people" (R. 157); that Mr. Lyman had lived with her at 
her home in Lindon and that they were not discrete. (R. 157) 
6 
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Although the issues which gave rise to these conten-
tions of the Plaintiff were raised in their entirety by the 
proceedings on November 9, 1972, they were never dis-
covered and considered at any stage of the proceedings 
before the trial court. A careful search of the Order to 
Show Cause from which this appeal is perfected (R. 187) 
and of the Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show 
Cause (R. 176) demonstrates conclusively that such items 
were not on the agenda for consideration on January 17, 
1974. Not until July 1, 1974, twenty months from the 
date of the alleged offenses, did the plaintiff raise these 
considerations and then, only in the context of this appeal. 
The plaintiff did not appeal from the November 9, 
1972, Order which stayed the effective date of the Decree, 
or from the April 20, 1973, Order which set aside the 
default judgment. When the Court considered, at a hear-
ing attended by counsel for the parties, the arguments for 
setting aside the default, the plaintiff's trial counsel did 
not contend as her appellate counsel now does, that the 
Court's earlier Order on November 9 had deprived his 
client of due process of law or of material rights. Not at 
the trial, at the hearing on the First Order to Show Cause 
on December 7, 1973, or at the hearing on the Second 
Order to Show Cause dated January 17, 1974, were such 
considerations raised, by either Plaintiff's trial or appel-
late Counsel. 
The Plaintiff did not appeal from the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court, at the conclusion of the trial (R. 
133) which was embodied in the Decree dated August 
27, 1973. (R. 140) Only now are the considerations raised 
7 
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on this appeal from the decision on the Second Order to 
Show Cause which was heard six months after the trial 
and roughly five months after the date of the entry of 
the Decree. The hearing, from which this appeal is taken, 
was held to consider a question of contempt on a custody 
question and to consider, six months after the trial, the 
reduction of alleged temporary alimony, support and 
attorney's fees to judgment. (R. 187) 
The Court's Order dated April 20, 1973, setting aside 
a Default Judgment against the Defendant like the Order 
of November 9, 1972, staying the effective date of the 
Decree, was in the nature of an interlocutory order to be 
raised on appeal by reference to the provisions of Rule 
72 (b). Baer v. Young, 25 U.2d 198, 479 P.2d 351. The 
time in which to appeal such determinations had long run 
on January 17, 1974, when the second post-trial Order to 
Show Cause was heard by Judge Sawaya. Whether appeal-
ed as an interlocutory order under Rule 72 (b), or as a 
final order under Rule 72 (a), the period for appeal had 
expired when, on February 18, 1974, seven months after 
the trial, the Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. 
205) The Plaintiff made no effort after the entry of either 
of the orders to preserve a right of appeal on the issues 
which were decided, pending a final determination of 
other claims. No document was filed with the trial court 
or served on opposing counsel indicating notice of intent 
to appeal.2 
An interlocutory appeal, particularly, is properly 
granted if it appears essential to adjudicate threshold 
2
 The procedure required by Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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principles of law or procedure as a foundation upon which 
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high likelihood that 
the litigation can be finally disposed of on such an appeal. 
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361 P.2d 177. That the 
Appellant's counsel considered the November 9, 1972, 
issue to be one of that character is clearly indicated in his 
declaration that "A resolving of this point (i.e. declaring 
the order a nullity) leaves all other questions moot." 
(App's. Brief, p. 12) 
Having taken their chances on the trial of the matter 
without preliminary appeal under Rule 72 (b), without 
preserving the right to appeal decided issues under Rule 
72 (a) and without appealing from the Decree in normal 
fashion under the same rule, the questions now raised 
are untimely. It would be a serious circumvention of the 
appellate procedure if such substantive matters could be 
raised six months subsequent to the trial in the context 
of an appeal from an order to show cause. Such an 
effort is particularly devious when the controverted 
issues were, as here, not raised at the time of the hearing 
on the Order to Show Cause or in the pleadings which at-
tended it. 
Failure to appeal when the Orders were made, or at 
the conclusion of the trial, effectively precludes the pres-
ent assertion of such issues. When an attempted appeal 
is untimely, this Court does not acquire jurisdiction to con-
sider the matter. Watson v. Anderson, 29 Ut. 2d 36, 504 
P.2d 1003. See also: Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Ut. 2d 277> 
282 P.2d 845. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE DIVORCE WAS NOT FINAL WHEN 
THE ORDER STAYING THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE WAS ENTERED. 
The Plaintiff argues, on this appeal, that the Decree 
was filed on August 9, 1972, and that the Motion to Set 
Aside was filed on November 9, 1972, more than three 
months after the filing of the Decree. Section 30-3-7 
U.C.A. as amended is cited for the proposition that the 
Decree, three months having expired, became absolute be-
fore the Motion to Set Aside was filed. 
The per curiam opinion of this Court in In re Lynch's 
Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P. 2d 454 is directly in point. In 
the Lynch case, the appealable order was entered on No-
vember 22, 1952. The Notice of Appeal, although it had 
been served on the respondent in a timely fashion, was not 
filed with the Court until December 23, 1952. The Re-
spondent, the executrix of the estate, moved to dismiss 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the notice 
was not filed within one month after the appellant's 
motion, the denial of which constituted the appealable 
order, was denied. In dismissing the appeal the Court 
took the position that "One month is a calendar month."8 
This is the position most generally taken by the majority 
of our Courts.4 This Court stated, (concerning the "cal-
endar month"), 
sIn Re Lynch's Estate, supra at 454. 
4
 See: 86 CJ.S. "Time", Section 10, page 837 (Calendar "month" 
termed "generally uniform"); 52 Am Jur "Time," Section 11, page 338, 
("the term 'month' is now universally computed by the calendar") See 
also: citations there furnished. 
10 
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"Such a month commences at the beginning of 
the day of the month on which it starts and ends at 
the expiration of the day before the same day of 
the next month. Thus a month which starts with 
the beginning of the first day of a calendar month 
would end at the end of the last day of such month, 
and not at the last end of the first day of the next 
month. If the month in question commenced on 
a day other than the first day of such month, such 
as at the beginning of the 23rd day of such month, 
it would end at the expiration of the 22nd day of 
the next month and not at the expiration of the 
23rd day of the next month, which would be the 
beginning of another month. In the present case 
we exclude from our calculation the day of the act 
or event after which the designated period of time 
begins to run, which is November 22,5 the day on 
which the motion was overruled, and start count-
ing from the beginning of the 23rd day of that 
month; from that time one month would end at 
the expiration of the 22nd day of December, or 
just before the 23rd commenced, which marked 
the beginning of another month.6 
Applying the same principle to the instant case, the 
difference being only between one month and three 
months, from August 10, 1972, the date of beginning, to 
November 9, 1972, is a period of three months. 
5
 For this exclusion there is statutory authority. Section 68-3-7 U.C.A., 
pertaining to the construction of statutes, reads as follows: 
"Time, how computed. — The time in which any act provided by 
law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and includ-
ing the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it is also excluded/' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Rule 6 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure likewise provides that, 
"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these 
rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the 
act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins 
to run is not to be included. . . ." (Emphasis supplied) 
6
 See also: Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d 845, which 
quotes liberally from the Lynch case and applies its underlying principles. 
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POINT III 
THE ORDER OF APRIL 20, 1973, NOT THE 
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 9, 1973, OPERATED 
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS REPRESENTED AT 
THE APRIL 20 HEARING BY HER TRIAL 
COUNSEL WHO APPEARED PURSUANT TO 
NOTICE. 
The central thrust of the Plaintiff's argument, Point 
1, is that the interlocutory decree was set aside without 
notice or hearing. The authorities cited in the Brief stand 
for this proposition. Such was not the case. Plaintiff con-
fuses the distinction between deferring the effective date 
of the Decree, withholding its finality, and the abroga-
tion of its terms and provisions. The Affidavit of De-
fendant's counsel asked that the Court "stay the effective 
date" of the Decree so that it should not become "binding 
and final" before the Defendant's Motion for relief from 
its terms could be heard. (R. 48, 49) The Court, "upon 
application or on its own motion for good cause shown" 
had the authority "to waive, alter or extend" the period 
of time before the Decree should become absolute for not 
to exceed six months.7 In addition to the Affidavit of 
Defendant's counsel, which alleged that the Defendant 
was neither present in person nor represented by counsel 
at the time of the hearing and the entry of the Default, 
the Court had before it when it entered its November 9 
Order the record which showed that the Defendant was a 
resident of Nevada served by means of the Long Arm 
Statute in that jurisdiction (R. 44), Findings of Fact which 
7
 Section 30-3-7 U.C.A. as amended. 
12 
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indicated that he was off work by reason of injury at the 
time the Decree was entered (R. 39) and a dollar award 
of $575.00 per month at a time when the Findings indi-
cated the Defendant had, as temporary income, relief 
funds of $125.00 per week. (R. 39) 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed 
on the same day that the Order of Judge Faux was entered. 
It was never intended that the Order of November 9 
should deprive the plaintiff of material rights without due 
process of law, or eliminate of itself, any right acquired 
by virtue of the Default Decree. The November 9 Order 
merely deferred the effective date of the Decree pending 
further order of the Court. 
On April 20, 1973, after a Stipulation of Counsel (R. 
58), after an exchange of Affidavits (R. 61, 52), after a 
continuance agreed upon by counsel (R. 57), and after one 
projected hearing at which Plaintiff's counsel failed to 
appear (R. 66), Plaintiff's trial counsel and Defendant's 
counsel appeared before the Court pursuant to Notice 
(R. 55, 65) and argued the merits of the Motion to Set 
Aside. The Court then explicitly said, after Notice, Affi-
davits, Argument and a Hearing that, 
". . . the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment is granted and . . . Defendant shall be 
entitled to answer each of the allegations of the 
original Complaint with the exception of those 
provisions pertaining to the dissolution of the 
marriage of the parties, which dissolution was 
ordered by the Court on the 16th day of January, 
1973, pursuant to a Stipulation on file herein." 
13 
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Not until the entry of this Order, was the Plaintiff de-
prived of any substantive right which she claimed to have 
derived from the earlier hearing at which the Defendant, 
against whom such rights were asserted, was neither pres-
ent nor represented by counsel. 
In substance and effect, Plaintiff's counsel ratified 
the November 9 Order in the Stipulation dated January 
11, 1973, when he agreed that all matters brought up in 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment 
other than the termination of the marital status "may be 
held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time Defendant's 
Motion is heard." (R. 58, emphasis supplied) 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING 
ASIDE ITS EARLIER ORDERS RELATING TO 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT. 
The original Order for temporary alimony and sup-
port money, like the original Decree, was predicated upon 
the erroneous assumption that the Defendant's income in 
1972 was comparable to his income in 1971, which had 
been $16,576.00. (R. 39) It was claimed, again in error, 
that the respondent earned, for the first six months of 
1972, in excess of $1,100.00 per month. (R. 39) These 
facts were perpetuated in the Appellant's Brief. (Brief, 
p. 15) 
The Defendant's 1972 tax return, which was utilized 
at the January 17, 1974 hearing and which is a matter of 
record (R. 96), disclosed that the Defendant in fact earned 
14 
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in 1972 a total of $5,254.00, when adjusted $4,733.00, 
which was received, almost in its entirety, before the dis-
abling injury of April 15, 1972. From April 15, 1972, 
through the trial of the matter on July 11, 1973, a period 
of in excess of one year, the Defendant had no earnings. 
For that period he was entitled to or received $50.00 per 
week for 26 weeks from the Teamsters Union; $75.00 per 
week for 52 weeks under the Drivers Benefit plan pro-
vided by Interstate Motor Lines;8 $1,000.00 as a result of 
his automobile injury and Social Security Disability. 
Although the Defendant was disabled when the orig-
inal Order was entered on July 20, 1972, a fact clearly 
known to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff proceeded to obtain, 
based on the uncontested factual findings related to the 
Defendant's income prior to his disability, an Order di-
recting the disabled and absent Defendant to pay, among 
other things, the $575.00 per month. This amounted, 
without consideration of peripheral items, such as the in-
debtedness of the parties, to an annual dollar award 
against the unemployed Defendant of $6,900.00. In addi-
tion, Plaintiff's appellate counsel has asserted that Plain-
tiff is entitled to attorney's fees in connection with a series 
of orders over an approximate 14 month period of 
$1,475.00. The total of the claimed support, alimony and 
attorney's fees, approximated, for the first year, $8,375.00, 
or nearly $700.00 per month. 
A series of judges, beginning with Judge Faux, who 
had entered the original Order (R. 34), Judge Snow who 
8
 On July 25, 1972, Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Garnishment (R. 
25) against IML Freight Lines. She then proceeded to collect 48 of the 
52 $75.00 weekly payments from IML. 
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set aside the Court's earlier orders and Judge Sawaya, the 
trial judge,0 considering the impossibility of the per-
formance of such orders, the jurisdictional problems con-
cerning their entry, and the faulty factual basis which sup-
ported them, all after careful and detailed consideration, 
made subsequent orders intended to alleviate the problem 
and provide the harried Defendant with some relief. 
Such orders did not unfairly discriminate against the 
Plaintiff. From April 1972, the date of his disability, to 
August of 1973, when the trial was completed, the De-
fendant received or otherwise had from all sources, the 
sum of $5,908.00.10 
During this same period of time, the Plaintiff re-
ceived funds from or on behalf of the Defendant in the 
approximate amount of $7,047.00.11 
9
 Who also heard two lengthy Orders to Show Cause subsequent to 
the trial, one of which, that of January 17, 1974, gave rise to this appeal. 
10
 Broken down, Defendant received: 
$1,300.00 Teamsters Health and Welfare 
670.00 Accrued payroll, IML 
322.00 Balance in bank at separation from Plaintiff 
1,000.00 Casualty Insurance payment, accident April 15, 1972 
2,316.00 Social Security Disability, November, 1972 through 
August of 1973 ($257.40 per month) 
300.00 IML Drivers Benefit Plan (4 weeks) 
$5,908.00 
11
 Broken down, Plaintiff received: 
$3,600.00 IML Drivers Benefit Plan (48 weeks) 
(figure approximate, some minor deductions) 
1,544.00 Social Security 
1,352.00 Second mortgage payments at Murray First Thrift 
and Loan Company (nine payments $900.00 made 
by disability insurance, four payments $452.00 
made by Defendant) 
484.00 1971 Tax refund. Defendant's name signed by Plain-
tiff 
67.20 Refund of casualty insurance. Defendant's name 
___ signed by Plaintiff. 
$7,047.60 
In addition to the aforegoing, Plaintiff had other income of at least 
$160.00 per month, net (R. 15). During the year 1972, Defendant made 
payments on other indebtedness of the parties in the amount of $650.81. 
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The Court, in its Memorandum Decision upon which the 
Decree was based, awarded the plaintiff the home of the 
parties, the equity in which was estimated at trial to have 
a value of $17,000.00. The Court did order that the 
Plaintiff pay the Defendant $4,000.00 for his interest in 
the home, as earlier mentioned, upon the happening of 
certain specified contingencies. 
The Plaintiff received through August of 1973, more 
than $1,000.00 more than the Defendant; together with 
the award of $13,000.00 of the approximate $17,000.00 
equity interest of the parties in their Salt Lake City home 
and the use, for a virtually indeterminate period, of the 
Defendant's share of such equity. 
That the amount now sought for retroactive payments 
was clearly understood to have been set aside was made 
clear by the simple fact that the question of an arrearage, 
such as that now urged in this appeal, was never raised at 
the time of trial. From April 20, 1973, to December 6, 
1973, when the Plaintiff's new counsel first raised the 
issue by affidavit (R. 150), there was no effort to claim 
the * "affidavit" retroactive payments despite the fact that 
all economic facets of the case were meticulously consid-
ered at the trial which concluded on July 11, 1973. 
The Openshaw case,12 which is cited for the central 
proposition of the Plaintiff's brief that the Court cannot 
retroactively modify alimony or child support install-
12
 105 Ut. 574, 144 P.2d 528 
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ments accrued and past due, is not applicable to the cir-
cumstances here. That case refers specifically to the modi-
fication of an existing and valid decree13 and does not 
govern a situation where a decree is set aside. If such 
were not the case, the Court would not have the power to 
set aside such installments, however abusive, in the face 
of any order, however invalid. In this case, reduced to its 
sum and substance, the Plaintiff concludes that the dis-
abled Defendant was obligated for the sum of $575.00 a 
month, plus attorney's fees, and that the Court was power-
less to afford relief. In effect, the Openshaw decision re-
ferred to cases involving the modification not the invalida-
tion of the original decree. In the former case, it is pre-
sumed that the facts, until they were so changed and 
altered as to permit the modification, supported the under-
lying order upon which the installments were based. In 
the latter instance it is presumed, as is in fact the case here, 
that for reasons which became later apparent, the under-
lying order was itself infirm and needed to be set aside 
rather than modified. 
The order giving rise to the claimed accrued install-
ments was based on incorrect facts and was impossible of 
performance. It was entered in the face of jurisdictional 
problems and complicated, through no fault of the De-
fendant, by the absence at the time of the Defendant or 
his counsel. Judge Sawaya expressly found that the earlier 
13
 In fact, the Decree in the Openshaw case which was decided on 
December 30, 1943, was originally entered on August 22, 1932. The final 
judgment was, then, at the time it was considered by this Court, over 11 
years old and the claimed installments were for a period of eight years. 
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orders of the Court "were set aside and that the issues con-
sidered and raised in such Orders were subsequently con-
sidered and merged into the final Decree." (R. 199) Plain-
tiff's trial counsel did not request that the alleged accrued 
installments be reduced to judgment at the time of trial or 
that they be included as additional items in the Decree 
which he in fact drafted. Plaintiffs counsel made no men-
tion of or claim for such items although, had he deemed 
them legitimate, their consideration could not have been 
other than a matter of first concern. 
Where an Order, or, as here, the Order and the De-
cree, is set aside; where the underlying order is invalid and 
not merely modified by reason of a later change in cir-
cumstance, then the payments which it requires should 
likewise be susceptible to retroactive modification or, 
more probably, cancellation, in the sound discretion of 
the trial Court. 
In Edwards v. Edwards (Kansas), 324 P2d 150 (1958) 
the Kansas Supreme Court, which applied the Openshaw 
principle to installments of permanent alimony and sup-
port, took the position that the rule that past due install-
ments for child support ordered paid by the final decree 
become final judgments as of the dates due and that 
they may be collected in the same manner as other 
judgments is inapplicable to past due installments of sup-
port allowed pendente lite divorce action. The Court 
reasoned that an Order for temporary support pendente 
lite was a temporary or ad interim provision not in the 
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nature of a final judgment on which execution can issue.14 
It concluded that "no vested rights" are acquired in the 
amount allowed the wife and children pending the divorce 
action. Quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, the Court said, 
"Like other interlocutory orders, an order for sup-
port money pendente lite entered pursuant to G.S. 
1949, 60-1507, remains solely in the sound discre-
tion of court which made it, (citations omitted) and 
may be modified as varying circumstances justify 
during the time the action is pending in any form 
in the district court, even to the extent of discharg-
ing accrued and unpaid installments." (citations 
omitted) 
Many Courts have departed from the restrictions 
placed upon the retroactive modification of installments 
of permanent alimony which have accrued, the proposition 
for which the Opens haw case, now over 30 years old 
stands. 
In 6 ALR 2d, it is stated that, 
14
 The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that, unlike an order for 
permanent alimony or support which represents a final determination of 
the rights of the parties, an application for a temporary order does not 
concern the merits of the action. In temporary proceedings the Court is 
concerned that the complaint states a cause of action, that the plaintiff 
is prosecuting the cause in good faith, that the parties are married and that 
the wife and children are in need of support during the pendency of pro-
ceedings. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, concluding that its decision was supported 
by the preponderant weight of authority, took the position that the 
District Court had full control of the interim procedure, including the 
power to review, modify, revoke or reinstate its temporary order at any 
time. Since, the Court said, the temporary order did not touch upon the 
merits of the action, it did not qualify as a final order (i.e. by Kansas 
statute, an order affeaing a substantial right in an action) and hence 
an order amending, modifying or revoking the ad interim provision was 
not itself appealable. 
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"However, if there is any point to be gained 
in characterizing a view as majority or minority, it 
is submitted that the courts in the majority of the 
states have the power to grant the husband relief, 
either directly by cancelling arrears or indirectly 
by refusing to enforce payment or by restraining 
the wife from collecting arrears." 
The power to modify an order for alimony pendente 
lite includes the power to cancel accrued and unpaid in-
stallments. 24 Am Jur 2, "Divorce and Separation", Sec-
tion 557, p. 682. Had the Order for the payment of the 
claimed alimony not been set aside, as it in fact was, the 
Court had the power to cancel the arrearage. Such a can-
cellation proved unnecessary, however, since the under-
lying order and the Decree upon which the installments 
Were predicated, was repudiated and void ab initio. The 
Court concluded that the original decree of August 9, 
1972, was set aside and was "of no force and effect". Judge 
Sawaya also determined that the orders upon which the 
plaintiff's claim for alimony and support allegedly in 
arrears were predicated "were set aside and the issues merg-
ed in the final decree". (Memorandum Decision, James S. 
Sawaya, R. 200) Had the Court not so found, it could have, 
under prevailing authorities, even in the face of valid and 
subsisting orders, have cancelled the arrears. 
The Court expressly found as a factual matter, that 
during the time when the alleged arrearages were accumu-
lating "the defendant was disabled and unable to financi-
ally meet this obligation . . ." (R. 200) Where the Court 
has the power to cancel arrears of alimony, the fact that 
the husband's ability to pay alimony or support has be-
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come impaired after the entry of the original decree is a 
ground for cancelling all or part of the arrears which 
accrued because of such inability to pay. Kumlin v. Kum-
lin, 200 Minn. 26, 273 N.W. 253, See also: 6 ALR 2d 1294 
section 10. In this case, the Defendant's disability was, to 
make matters worse, an accomplished fact prior to the 
entry of the offending orders. The recitals concerning Mr. 
Eskelson's 1971 and 1972 income, while not totally in-
accurate, were misleading when applied to his circum-
stances at the time of the entry of the default judgments. 
A number of cases have taken the position that where 
temporary alimony has been awarded during the pendency 
of an action for divorce, and thereafter, a final judgment 
or decree is entered awarding a divorce, the wife may not 
thereafter enforce the order for temporary alimony for the 
amount due at the time of the dismissal or final decree, 
unless the right to such installments is saved by the final 
decree. Richardson v. Richardson, 218 Minn. 42, 15 N.W. 
2d 127; Maddox v. Maddox, 276 Ala. 197, 160 So. 2d 
481. In New York all proceedings to enforce the payment 
of temporary alimony must be taken during the pendency 
of the action. Mittman v. Mittman, 263 App. Div. 384, 
33 NYS 2d 211. Such a position does not necessitate the 
forfeiture by the wife of all rights to enforce the pay-
ment of arrearages. It does preserve such rights, when 
proper, by appropriate provision in the final decree. 
Surely, the consideration of such items is essential to prop-
er consideration of the allocation of assets. It is unlikely, 
had plaintiff and her counsel not stood mute at trial with 
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respect to the question of the only recently asserted arrear-
ages, that the Court would have awarded the plaintiff 
virtually the entire equity in the home of the parties, the 
primary asset of their over 20 year marriage. 
A finding by this Court that the trial Court's decision 
was supported by the evidence and within the Court's 
power, should also govern those questions raised in the 
appellant's brief concerning attorney's fees.15 The rules 
which govern the allowance of suit money, including 
attorney's fees, are ordinarily the same as those which 
govern the allowance of temporary alimony. Tolls v. 
Tolls, 160 Ar. 317, 85 P2d 366, 119 ALR 1370. Judge 
Sawaya expressly found, from a profusion of different 
orders, that the total of the attorney's fees as merged in 
the Decree was $500.00. To this he added additional ex-
penses for two separate hearings. (R. 200) One was the 
hearing setting aside the Decree. By this expedient, the 
Judge again affirmed his belief that the original orders, 
in which the numerous claimed awards for attorney's fees 
were found, had been set aside and were of no force and 
effect. 
15
 And also the IML stock, which is not stock in the Company but 
shares in the Credit Union, pledged on the parties' obligation. The pro-
vision for the allocation of the stock was contained in the original Decree, 
August 9, 1972, which was set aside. (R. 203) 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial Court acted within its powers after detailed 
consideration of the facts. A careful reading of the record 
dispels the notion that any error was committed which 
would justify the reversal of the Court's Memorandum 
Decision. The appeal is, as to all matters, untimely. The 
Order made on January 28, 1974, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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